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Winners and Losers: German Equity Mutual Funds  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The performance of individual US and UK mutual funds has been extensively analyzed.  
On balance, studies find relatively weak evidence of positive alpha performance (“selectivity”) in 
the extreme right tail of the cross-section performance distribution and relatively strong evidence 
of negative alpha performance throughout the left tail (e.g. Malkiel 1995, Kosowski et al 2006, 
Cuthbertson et al 2008, 2010a, Fama and French 2010).  Successful market timing involves fund 
managers increasing (decreasing) their fund’s market-beta in anticipation of an increase 
(decrease) in market returns.   Evidence for successful market timing in both parametric and non-
parametric studies has been found (for the US see for example, Treynor and Mazuy 1966, 
Henriksson and Merton 1981, Ferson and Schadt 1996, Busse 1999, Becker et al 1999, Wermers 
2000, Bollen and Busse 2001, Jiang 2003, Swinkels and Tjong-A-Tjoe 2007, Jiang et al 2007, 
Chen and Liang 2007 and for the UK see Chen et al 1992, Fletcher 1995, Leger 1997, Byrne et al 
2006, Cuthbertson et al 2010b). 
 
There has been little work done on analysing the performance of the German mutual fund 
industry, in particular regarding the market timing ability of fund managers.  Although the German 
mutual fund industry is small compared to the US, it has seen substantial growth over the last 15 
to 20 years and its assets under management peaked in 2007 at $372bn, but then dropped to 
$237bn at end of 2008.  However, it is expected that the German mutual fund industry will 
become more important in future years as reforms to private pension provision place greater 
emphasis on defined contribution pensions (i.e. ‘Riester Rente’) and reforms result in a less 
generous state pension. 
 
 Krahnen et al (2006) analysed 13 German domestic equity funds (1987-1998), Stehle 
and Grewe (2001) analysed 18 equity funds (1973 to 1998), Griese and Kempf (2003) use 118 
equity funds (1980 to 2000) and all find no positive statistically significant alphas.  Otten and 
Bams (2002) analyse the performance of 4 portfolios of German equity funds and find 
predominantly negative and statistically insignificant alphas.  Bessler, Drobetz and Zimmermann 
(2009) use an (unconditional and conditional) CAPM,  a 3 factor Fama-French model and an SDF 
model on 50 German domestic equity funds (1994-2003) and find statistically significant 
underperformance and no outperformance, particularly for the SDF model.  None of these studies 
examines market timing.  
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Many newspapers and trade journals present performance results in the form of league 
tables, so they too emphasize funds in the tails of the cross-section distribution.  This gives rise to 
two major problems.  First, because we are dealing with ordered/ranked funds, the performance 
distribution for a particular ranked fund (e.g. the best, or 2nd best, etc) differs from that of the 
parent distribution. For example, if the cross-section of funds’ “true” alphas are normally 
distributed with a mean of zero, and a sample of n-funds is drawn from this distribution, then the 
distribution of the fund with the largest alpha (i.e. the best performing fund) will be non-normal 
with a positive mean.  Second, if the performance statistic (alpha) for different funds have 
unknown and different underlying distributions, then the performance distribution of a particular 
percentile fund (e.g. the best fund) has to be obtained empirically1.  The contribution of this paper 
is to derive the empirical distributions for individual funds in the tails of the performance 
distribution, for a large number of German equity mutual funds using 20 years (1990-2009) of 
monthly data, for alternative factor models (including market timing effects) and bootstrap 
procedures.  We use both alpha (“selectivity”) as our performance measure and a measure of 
“total performance” ( iperf ) which combines both the fund’s alpha and the contribution of market 
timing to fund returns. 
 
When using gross returns and the Fama-French three factor (3F) model, the number of 
statistically significant positive alpha funds is zero but increases markedly when market timing 
variables are added.  However, when using a “total performance” measure (which incorporates 
alpha and the contribution of market timing), the number of statistically significant winner funds 
falls to zero.  The latter is consistent with bias in estimated alphas in the presence of market 
timing.  Our results therefore suggest that extreme caution should be used when assessing skill 
purely in terms of “selectivity” when market timing is present and that in these circumstances a 
better and more robust metric is “total performance”.  We also find that many poorly performing 
funds are genuinely unskilled (rather than unlucky) when using either selectivity (alpha, in the 3F-
model) or a total performance measure (in a market timing model).   
 
Results for winner funds are consistent with the Berk and Green (2004) competitive 
equilibrium model (with decreasing returns to scale based on fund size) - but the presence of 
many statistically significant unskilled funds is not.  However, the latter result may be partly 
rationalized in the theoretical model of Pastor and Stambaugh (2010) where decreasing returns to 
scale apply to the size of the active fund industry as a whole.  They find that even when industry 
average performance is negative, the size of the active mutual fund industry may remain large 
                                                 
1
   The theory of order statistics deals with the relationship between the underlying distribution of possible 
outcomes (e.g. normal) and the distribution of say the maximum value from a sample of size n. Analytic results are only 
available if the underlying distributions are known. 
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and also far from its equilibrium.  In such circumstances it may be possible to observe large 
statistically significant negative performance statistics over considerable time periods because 
learning about the true parameters governing decreasing returns to scale and hence future 
performance is slow – in short, inertia in information processing results in investors continuing to 
hold poorly performing funds2.    
 
 
2.  Methodology and Performance 
A cross-section bootstrap procedure is used to separate ‘skill’ from ‘luck’ for individual 
ranked funds, when idiosyncratic risks are highly non-normal (Kosowski et al 2006).  Consider an 
estimated model of equilibrium returns of the form: titiiti eXr ,, 'ˆˆ    for i = {1, 2, …, n 
funds} , where iT  = number of observations on fund-i, tir ,  = excess return on fund-i, tX = vector 
of risk factors and tie ,  are the residuals.   
 
Our ‘basic bootstrap’ under the null of no outperformance is as follows.  First, estimate 
the chosen model for each fund (separately) and save the vectors  ,ˆ, ,t i i tX e .  Next, for each 
fund-i, draw a random sample (with replacement) of length iT  from the residuals tie , .  Use these 
re-sampled bootstrap residuals tie ,
~
 (and their corresponding tX  values), to generate a simulated 
excess return series tir ,
~
 for fund-i, under the null hypothesis ( i  = 0) that is,  
tititi eXr ,,
~
'
ˆ0~   . This is repeated for all funds in our sample. This gives simulated returns 
for all funds under the null of zero alphas, for the first run of the bootstrap (B=1).   
 
Next, using the simulated returns tir ,
~ for each fund, the performance model is estimated 
fund-by-fund and the resulting estimates of alpha (say) )1(~i  (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) are obtained (for 
the first bootstrap, B=1).  The )1(~i  estimates for each of the n-funds represent sampling variation 
around a true value of zero (by construction) and are entirely due to ‘luck’.  The )1(~i  {i = 1, 2, .., 
                                                 
2
  Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2010) model focuses on the relationship between the size of the mutual fund industry 
and industry average performance, rather than on individual fund performance. It is therefore likely that persistently poor 
performance by some funds also requires an assumption of “frictions” in the ability to switch from poorly performing to 
potential winner funds.  Other explanations of long-term negative performance include pure  inertia, influences of broker 
and manager advertising  and  tax considerations (Gruber, 1996) or negative performance as a payoff  for countercyclical 
performance (Glode, 2009) or that investors buy and sell actual index funds at the wrong time, and passive indices do not 
reflect this (Savov 2009). 
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n} are then ordered from highest to lowest, (1)max  to (1)min  - these are the n-values of alpha from 
the 1st run of the bootstrap.  The above process is repeated B = 1,000 times for each of the n-
funds which gives a separate ‘luck distribution’ for each of the ordered funds ( )if  in the 
performance distribution - from the best alpha-performer to the worst alpha-performer, all of which 
are solely due to luck.  
 
For example, the 1,000 values for ( )max
B  (for B = 1, 2, 3, …, 1000) represent the values of 
max  which occur by chance under the null that all funds have zero alphas - this “empirical” null 
distribution max( )f  can be represented in a histogram.  We can then compare the estimated 
value of alpha maxˆ  for our “top ranked fund” using actual returns data, with its appropriate ‘luck 
distribution’.  If maxˆ  is greater than the 5% upper tail cut-off point of max( )f  , we reject the null 
that its performance is due to luck (at 95% confidence) and infer that the fund has skill.   
 
This above procedure can be applied to a fund at any percentile of the performance 
distribution, right down to the ex-post worst performing fund.  A key element of the approach is 
that under the null of zero alpha, we do not assume the distribution of the estimated alpha for 
each fund is normal.  Each fund’s alpha can follow any distribution (depending on the fund’s 
residuals) and this distribution can be different for each fund.  Hence the distribution under the 
null max( )f  , encapsulates all of the different individual fund’s empirical ’luck distributions’ (and in 
a multivariate context this cannot be derived analytically from the theory of order statistics).  We 
can also repeat the above bootstrap analysis for the t-statistic of alpha 
i
t~  which gives more 
robust inference in the extreme tails (Kosowski et al 2006)3.     
 
Our alternative performance models are well known ‘factor models’.  The Fama and 
French (1993) 3F-model is:   
 
[1] 
, 1 , 2 3 ,i t i i m t i t i t i tr r SMB HML          
 
                                                 
3
   
i
t is a “pivotal statistic” and has better sampling properties than i  - the obvious reason being that the former 
‘corrects for’ high risk-taking funds (i.e. 
i  large), which are likely to be in the tails.  If different funds have different 
distributions of idiosyncratic risk (e.g. different skewness and kurtosis) then we cannot say a priori what the distribution of 
( )
i
f t will be – this is why we use the cross-section bootstrap.  Fama and French (2010) bootstrap on ˆ( )it ir  across all 
funds-i with the same time subscript and therefore incorporate any contemporaneous correlations in the residuals across 
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where 
,i tr  is the excess return on fund-i (over the risk-free rate), ,m tr  is the excess return on the 
market portfolio while tSMB  and tHML  are size and book-to-market value factors.  The Fama 
and French (1993) 3F-model has mainly been applied to UK funds (e.g. Blake and Timmermann 
1998, Quigley and Sinquefield 2000, Tonks 2005) and German funds (e.g. Bessler et al 2009, 
Otten and Bams 2002) whereas for US funds the momentum factor (Carhart 1997) is usually 
found to be statistically significant.  Market timing in the one-factor Treynor and Mazuy (TM, 
1966) model has a time varying market beta which depends linearly on the market return, 
,t t m t tr r e     with 0 ,t m t tr v     , which results in the TM estimation equation: 
 
[2] 0 , ,[ ]t m t m t tr r f r         where  2, ,[ ]m t m tf r r  
 
The Hendricksson-Merton (HM, 1981) model assumes the market beta depends on the 
directional response of the market, 0 ( )t t tI v       where tI   = 1 when , 0m tr   and zero 
otherwise, which results in the HM estimation equation: 
 
[3] 0 , ,[ ]t m t m t tr r f r         where  , ,[ ]m t t m tf r I r  
 
If 0 ( 0)    this indicates successful (unsuccessful) market timing and security 
selection is given by 0   - separating out these two effects is known as performance 
attribution.  Biases in estimating selectivity (alpha) and market timing  , when the HM (TM) 
model is true but the TM (HM) model is estimated, are possible.  However Coles et al (2006) 
show that although these individual biases are large, they are almost offsetting and they suggest 
using a measure of “total performance”, when market timing is present.  We use the Bollen and 
Busse (2004) measure of total performance. 
 
[4] 
, ,1
(1/ ) ( [ ]) [ ]Ti i i m t i i m ttperf T f r f r         
 
Total performance iperf  measures the average abnormal return from both security 
selection ( i ) and the ability to successfully time the market 0i   - since the average abnormal 
return '
,
[ ]i i t i i m tr X f r     .  Measuring security selection (alpha) without simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                 
funds – our reported results are invariant to this alternative bootstrap procedure as the contemporaneous correlations in 
our data are small. 
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considering the effect on fund performance of market timing effects, can give a misleading picture 
of overall performance.  Clearly, good security selection 0i   together with negative market 
timing 0i   (or vice versa), may not be beneficial for investors (relative to investing in a passive 
portfolio).  Inclusion of market timing in the 3F model is straightforward.    
 
We test 0 : 0iH perf   for each ranked fund using our cross-section bootstrap 
procedure and a joint hypothesis test on ( , )i i  .  For the 3F-market timing model, we generate 
simulated returns tir ,
~
 for each fund, by bootstrapping on the residuals under the restriction 
,
[ ] 0i i m tf r    for all funds.  The simulated returns tir ,~  under the null, are then used to re-
estimate the 3F versions of equation [2] or [3] for all n-funds, to obtain values of 
0
,
[ ]H ii i m tperf f r    for each fund-i (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n).  The values of 0Hiperf  for all n-funds 
are then ranked.  For example, for the best performing fund we take largest value 0max
Hperf  as our 
first bootstrap value (B=1).  We repeat the above procedure B = 1,000 times and obtain 1,000 
values for 0max
Hperf  which are solely due to random variation around the null of zero total 
performance for all funds - this gives us the null distribution 0max( )Hf perf  for the best ranked fund.  
Using actual fund returns we estimate 
,
ˆˆ [ ]data ii i m tperf f r    for each fund and find the 
largest value max
dataperf , which is then compared to the 5% cut-off point of the ordered null 
distribution, 0max( )Hf perf .  
 
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
We use a comprehensive, monthly data set (free of survivorship bias) over 20 years 
(January 1990 to December 2009) for 555 German domiciled equity mutual funds (each with at 
least 24 monthly observations)4 of which 85 invest solely in German equities, with the remainder 
investing outside Germany (“European” and “Global”).  Gross returns are returns to the fund (i.e. 
before deduction of expenses) while net returns are (before-tax) returns to investors (i.e. after 
deduction of management fees).   
 
                                                 
4
   The data set is from Bloomberg and consists of over 600 funds. This is reduced to just 555 after stripping out 
second units and funds with less than 2 years of data history.   
 8 
Our factors are measured in the standard way.  For funds with German, European and 
Global geographic mandates we have used the appropriate MSCI total return indices.  For each 
geographical mandate, the SMB variables have been calculated by subtracting the total return 
index of the small cap MSCI index from the relevant market index.  Similarly, HML is defined as 
the difference between the total return indices of the MSCI value index less the MSCI growth 
index for the specific geographic region5.  The risk-free rate is the 1-month Frankfurt money 
market rate.  All variables are measured in Euros (or German Marks prior to the introduction of 
the Euro).   
 
[Table 1 - here] 
 
Table 1 (Panel A) shows that by limiting our analysis to funds with T ≥ 24 observations 
we discard about 85 funds in our complete sample of 619 funds, of which about 45 of the funds 
discarded are “live” and 40 are “dead” funds and those discarded are mainly from funds invested 
with a European and Global mandate, rather than funds which invest in German stocks. Our 
sample of 555 funds (with T ≥ 24) consists of 364 “surviving funds” and 119 “dead funds”.   
Average management fees and the spread of fees across funds and fund styles are similar and 
are also reasonably constant over time (Table 1, Panel B).    
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics using net returns, for the Fama and French 3-factor 
model and the 3F model augmented with either the TM or HM market timing variables.  For each 
model, cross-sectional (across funds) average statistics are calculated for all funds.  The market 
return is highly significant followed by the SMB factor, while the HML factor and the market timing 
variables are not statistically significant, on average.  The adjusted-R2 across all three models is 
around 0.75, while the average skewness and kurtosis of the residuals is around -0.2 and 8 
respectively and about 45% of funds have non-normal errors (bottom half of table 2) – thus 
motivating the use of bootstrap procedures6.  Around 545 funds (from our 555) have statistically 
significant positive market betas (10% significance level).  For the SMB factor around 420 funds 
are significantly positive while 17 funds have negative and statistically significant SMB-betas.  
The number of significant positive HML-betas is 103, with 247 having significant negative betas.  
Hence many more German funds invest in small rather than large stocks and are “growth 
orientated” rather than value orientated.  For the 3F+TM model, we have 60 (158) funds with a 
                                                 
5
  We do not have data on the Carhart (1997) momentum factor for those German domiciled funds who invest only 
in Germany and the much larger number who invest outside Germany.  
6
  The above results also apply when gross returns (i.e. returns before deduction of fees) are used.  This is 
because fees are relatively constant over time.  
 9 
statistically significant positive (negative) market timing coefficient i 7.  We concentrate on 
results from the 3F model and the 3F+TM market timing model.  (Results from the 3F+HM model 
are qualitatively similar and are not reported). 
 
[Table 2 - here] 
 
Winner Funds 
The average management fee is 1.22% p.a. with a standard deviation (across funds) of 
0.46 and is fairly constant over time.  Below, we report results using gross returns (i.e. before 
deduction of management fees) – if a fund cannot achieve a statistically significant positive 
performance or has a negative performance in terms of gross returns, then such funds provide an 
even worse performance in terms of net returns to investors.  After applying the cross-section 
bootstrap there are about 250 (out of 555) funds with positive alpha-performance statistics, 
across the different specifications.  Table 3 (Panel A) reports alpha and t-alpha statistics (together 
with their bootstrap p-values) for funds at chosen percentiles, after ranking funds by each of these 
performance statistics, using the unconditional 3F model.  “Alpha sort” is the value of alpha for a 
specific fund at a chosen percentile, after all funds’ alphas have been sorted from highest to 
lowest.  “t-alpha sort” is defined analogously for the t-statistic of alpha.  The 3F model gives no 
statistically significant positive-alpha funds (at a 5% significance level) – whether we use alpha or 
t-alpha as our performance statistic (Table 3, Panel A).   
 
We now examine alpha-performance in the 3F model with the addition of the TM market 
timing variable, 2
,m tr .  First, there is a dramatic increase in the number of statistically significant 
positive-alpha funds to around 200-240, and in the size of the alphas.  This is illustrated in figure 
1 where the kernel density for the estimated (non-ordered) alphas in the 3F+TM model (dashed 
line) lies to the right of the alpha estimates in the 3F-model (solid line).  
 
We can compare the alpha and t-alpha performance of individual funds at particular percentiles of 
the performance distribution using the 3F model (Table 3, Panel A) and  the 3F+TM market timing model  
(Table 3, Panel B).  For example, using the 3F model (Table 3, Panel A), the fund ranked by alpha 
at the 10th percentile (“top 10%”) the value of alpha is 3.8% p.a. (p = 0.97) but this increases to 
6.9% (p = 0.0007) in the 3F+TM model (Panel B).  Using t-alpha as the performance measure a 
                                                 
7
  Some caveats are in order when considering market timing results.  The market timing parameter i  may be 
biased downwards (but not upwards) because of cash-flow effects (Warther,1995, Ferson and Warther 1996 and Edelen 
1999).  In addition,  spurious timing effects can arise from option-like characteristics (Jagannathan and Korajczyk 1986), 
and interim trading  (Goetzmann et al 2000, Ferson and Khang 2002), while  “artificial timing bias” can arise even in 
“synthetic passive portfolios” (Bollen and Busse 2001).  Hence we cannot rule out the possibility that some of our timing 
coefficients may be spurious.   
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similar increase occurs, as we add the TM market timing variable to the 3F model.  For example, 
taking the fund ranked by t-alpha at the 10th percentile, the value of t-alpha is 1.16 (p = 0.99) for 
the 3F model (Panel A) whereas for the market timing model t-alpha increases to 1.70 (p 
<0.0001).  This pattern of results occurs for all positive alpha funds reported in Table 3.  It would 
appear that the market timing model (Panel B) provides much stronger evidence of successful 
security selection skills than the 3F model (Panel A).   
 
[Figure 1 – here] 
[Table 3 - here] 
 
However, using the 3F+TM model, and our measure of total performance - which 
combines the effect on returns of both security selection and market timing - we again find no 
(statistically significant) skilled funds whether we rank funds by iperf  or perft .  Table 3 for the 
3F+TM model, shows that for funds at specific percentiles, positive alpha-performance is 
prevalent (Panel B) but positive performance based on our total performance statistic iperf  is not 
(Panel C).  For example, for the fund ranked at the 10th percentile (“Top 10%”) we have perf = 
0.32% p.m. (p = 0.99) and perft = 1.18 (p = 1.0) which suggests no skill.  Figure 2, reinforces this 
result by comparing the ranked performance of all funds with positive values of alpha or positive 
values of perf , for  the 3F+TM model.   Figure 2  shows for each ranked fund, the estimated 
performance statistic (solid line) using actual fund data and the bootstrap 5% critical value under 
the null of zero performance (dashed line) – for alpha (Panel A) and for total performance iperf  
(Panel B), both using the 3F+TM model.  Panel A clearly shows a substantial number of 
statistically significant positive-alpha funds ranked from the 30th best to the 250th best fund – as 
for these funds the estimated alphas using actual fund data (solid line) exceed their 5% critical 
values.  But when we use iperf  (Panel B), the estimated values of iperf  using actual fund data 
(solid line) lie to the left of the bootstrap 5% critical values, for all of the ranked funds.  Hence, we 
conclude that “total performance” for all actively managed German equity mutual funds is solely 
due to luck, not skill.     
 
[Figure 2 - here] 
 
Overall, we conclude that there are no statistically significant “winner funds”, even before 
deduction of management fees.  This is because we discount the statistically significant results on 
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selectivity (alpha) in the 3F+TM model which are subject to potential bias and because iperf  is a 
sensible performance metric in the presence of market timing8.     
 
Loser Funds 
Using gross returns we have a large number of funds that are unskilled whatever 
performance metric or factor model we use.  At a 5% significance level, we find 307 unskilled 
funds based on the ordered bootstrap t-alpha of the 3F-model, 43 based on the order bootstrap t-
alpha of the 3F+TM model and 203 based on the bootstrap t-statistic of iperf  - out of a total of 
555 funds.  These performance results are model dependent but potential biases in alpha when 
market timing is present, suggests concentrating on the negative alphas from the 3F model 
(Table 3, Panel A) or negative values for our total performance measure, iperf  (Table 3, Panel 
C).   
 
 For the 3F-model, the ranked t ’s for nearly all the percentile funds reported in the right-
hand side of Panel A are negative and statistically significant (based on bootstrap p-values).  
However, for the (3F+MT) model, funds located at specific percentiles reported for the worst 
performers (Table 3, Panel C) are not representative of the statistical significance of funds with 
negative values of perft , across all funds in our sample.  As can be seen in figure 3, for the 
3F+MT model there are a substantial number of statistically significant negative perft funds in the 
left tail up to 438th ranked fund - as the actual perft  values (solid line) for these funds lie below 
their 5% bootstrap critical values (dashed line)9.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
 For alpha-performance in the 3F model and total performance in the 3F+TM model both 
performance measures clearly show that many loser funds are unskilled rather than unlucky.  
                                                 
8
  Using net returns (i.e. after deduction of management fees) this result applies a fortiori for alpha in the 3F model 
and for iperf  in the 3F+TM model.  Hence potential “winner” funds with either positive alpha or positive iperf  are merely 
lucky rather than exhibiting true (statistically significant) outperformance, for all ordered funds – these results are available 
on request.  
9
  Figure 3 also shows that funds in the very extreme left tail  with negative perft  experience bad luck rather than 
being unskilled, as their perft  statistic is not statistically different from zero(at a 5% significance level).  Using net returns 
to investors, the equivalent results for negative performers for all three models (not reported) have p-values less than 0.01 
– hence not surprisingly, for investors, there are a substantial number of loser funds which are genuinely unskilled rather 
than unlucky.   
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Despite the existence of low cost passive funds (either constructed from sector index 
mutual funds or ETFs), German investors continue to hold a large number of active funds which 
deliver a statistically significant negative abnormal performance (either in terms of alpha or total 
performance) – competition for investment funds does not appear to remove poorly performing 
funds from the marketplace.  This may have serious consequences as Germany moves from a 
predominantly state provided pensions system to pensions based (in part) on stock market 
performance. 
 
 
5. Conclusions       
At a methodological level, our results suggest that one should not assess “skill” purely in 
terms of “selectivity” (alpha) when market timing is present, since estimation bias is likely to be 
substantial.  In the presence of market timing a more useful and robust metric is “total 
performance” (which incorporates selectivity and the contribution to returns of successful market 
timing). 
 
Comparing results on security selection (alpha) in the 3F model (i.e. excluding market 
timing) with results using our measure of total performance iperf  in the 3F+TM model, we find 
that even in the tails of the performance distribution both measures give a consistent picture for 
German equity mutual fund investors.  For funds with an estimated positive net return 
performance (to investors), either due solely to alpha or in terms of total performance (in the 
presence of market timing) - all funds are merely lucky rather than exhibiting skill.  But for nearly 
all funds with negative estimated alphas (in the 3F model) or total performance (in the market 
timing model) these funds are genuinely unskilled, rather than unlucky.   
 
When we add back fees, then for alpha in the 3F model and total performance in the 
3F+TM model there are still no skilled funds even in the extreme right tail of the performance 
distribution but there are a substantial number of funds that are unskilled, delivering statistically 
significant negative abnormal performance (either alpha or total performance) before fees, and 
these funds are spread throughout much of the left tail of the performance distribution.  
 
  The message for German investors is clear – avoid active equity mutual funds and 
diversify using index tracker funds or ETFs. 
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Figure 1: Kernel Density: Alpha in 3F and 3F+TM Models  
 
 
This figure shows the kernel density for the estimated (non-ordered) alphas in the in the 3F-model 
(solid line) and the 3F+TM model (dashed line).  
 
Estimated alphas 
Kernel 
Density 
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Figure 2.  Winner Funds: Alpha versus Total Performance 
(3F+TM Model) 
 
The figures show each of the two performance measures (Panel A = alpha, Panel B= total performance, 
iperf ) plotted against the ordered funds – both performance measures use the 3F+TM model.  The solid 
lines are the estimated performance measures using actual fund data and the dashed lines are the bootstrap 
5% critical values of the null distributions for the ordered funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranked Funds 
Ranked Funds 
Alpha 
Total 
Performance 
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Figure 3.  Loser Funds: Total Performance 
(3F+TM Model) 
 
The figure shows the performance measure perft  plotted against the ordered funds for the 3F+TM model.  
The solid line is the estimated performance measure using actual fund data and the dashed line is the 
bootstrap 5% critical value of the null distribution for the ordered funds. 
 
 
t of  
total performance 
Ranked Funds 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Funds and Management Fees 
 
Panel A shows the total number of funds, the number of ‘live’ and ‘dead’ funds and details of the 
geographical investment objective. Panel B shows average annual management fees 
(percentage) and their standard deviation.   
 
 
 
Panel A : Number of Funds 
 
 All Funds German 
Funds 
European 
Funds 
Global 
Funds 
 
All Funds  
# funds  619 88 255 276 
# funds with at least 24 obs.  555 85 226 244 
 
‘Live’ Funds Only 
# funds  400 58 159 183 
# funds with at least 24obs.  364 57 143 164 
 
‘Dead’ Funds Only  
# of funds  219 30 96 93 
# of funds with more than 23 obs.  191 28 83 80 
 
Panel B : Management Fees (% p.a.) - Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
 All Funds German 
Funds 
European 
Funds 
Global 
Funds 
All Funds  1.22  (0.46) 1.22  (0.38) 1.13  (0.46) 1.29  (0.47) 
Funds with at least 24 obs.  1.22  (0.46) 1.22  (0.37) 1.13  (0.46) 1.30  (0.43) 
‘Live’ Funds Only  1.22  (0.42) 1.27  (0.38) 1.15  (0.43) 1.26  (0.42) 
‘Live’ funds with at least 24 obs.  1.22  (0.41) 1.26  (0.38) 1.15  (0.43) 1.28  (0.39) 
‘Dead’ Funds Only  1.21  (0.56) 1.03  (0.31) 1.09  (0.52) 1.38  (0.60) 
‘Dead’ funds at least 24 obs. 1.21  (0.53) 1.07  (0.28) 1.11  (0.53) 1.35  (0.55) 
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Table 2:  Factor Models and Market Timing 
 
This table reports summary statistics of all funds used in the analysis.  The sample period is January 1990 to 
December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 
observations. Returns are net of management fees.  The average number of observations used is 111 
months.  We report averages of the individual fund statistics for three different models (3F, and the 3F+TM 
and 3F+HM market timing models).  The first factor is the corresponding excess market return 
m
r , the 
second factor is the size factor SMB, and the third factor is the book-to-market factor, HML.  t-statistics are 
based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors.  BJ is the Bera-Jarque statistic for normality of residuals.  
 
 
Panel A : Mean Values of Coefficients and t-statistics 
 
 3F Model  
(rm, SMB, HML) 
 
3F+TM  
(rm, SMB, HML, rm2) 
3F+HM 
(rm, SMB, HML, rm+) 
 Alpha ( % p.m.) 
(t-stat) 
-0.1955 
(-0.7299) 
-0.1129 
(-0.3009) 
-0.0684 
(-0.1141) 
   
m
r  
(t-stat) 
0.9668 
(18.55) 
0.9509 
(17.91) 
0.9929 
(12.52) 
 SMB 
(t-stat) 
0.3326 
(2.62) 
0.3365 
(2.70) 
0.3360 
(2.69) 
HML 
(t-stat) 
-0.2068 
(-0.9530) 
-0.1839 
(-0.8597) 
-0.1876 
(-0.8669) 
TM-Timing variable : 
2
m
r  
- -0.0042 
(-0.4529) 
- 
HM-Timing variable : 
m
r

 
- - -0.0756 
(-0.3683) 
 
Panel B : Diagnostics 
 
 3F Model  
(rm, SMB, HML) 
3F+TM  
(rm, SMB, HML, rm2) 
3F+HM 
(rm, SMB, HML, rm+) 
Mean R2 0.7812 0.7896 0.7879 
Skewness -0.1586 -0.1173 -0.1252 
Kurtosis 8.14 7.97 7.99 
BJ – statistic 3123.34 3071.70 3077.62 
% (Number) funds 
non-normal residuals 
47.38% 
(263 funds) 
50.45% 
(280 funds) 
50.09% 
(278 funds) 
 
 
 Table3: Ordered Bootstrap Performance Measures: Gross Returns  
 
This table reports performance measures for the full sample of ordered funds using gross returns (i.e. before deduction of management fees).  Panel A reports 
alpha and t-alpha statistics from the unconditional 3F model for various percentiles of the performance distribution, together with their bootstrap p-values.  Panel B 
repeats this for alpha and t-alpha in the 3F+TM market timing model, while Panel C does so for the total performance measure perf and perft  statistics (also 
using the 3F+TM model).  “Fund’s rank” is the numerical position of the fund (out of a total of 555 funds) when a particular performance statistic (e.g. alpha) is 
used to rank funds from highest to lowest. For example, the fund at the 1st percentile (“Top 1%”) is the fund ranked 6th out of 555 funds.   “Alpha sort” is the value 
of alpha for a specific fund at a chosen percentile, after all funds’ alphas have been sorted from highest to lowest.   “t-alpha sort” is defined analogously for the t-
statistic of alpha.  “Perf sort” and “t-perf sort” are defined analogously to “alpha sort” and “t-alpha sort” - but funds are ranked using the total performance measures 
perf or perft .  Both actual (ex-post) and bootstrap t-statistics are based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors.  The sample period is January 1990 to 
December 2009 (monthly data) and includes 555 German domiciled mutual funds which have at least 24 observations. 
 
 
Panel A : Alpha,  3F model 
 
 Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% Bottom 20% Bottom 10% Bottom 5% Bottom 1% 
Fund’s Rank 6 28 56 112 445 500 528 550 
Alpha sort (% p.m.) 0.7956 0.4746 0.3159 0.1653 -0.3298 -0.5582 -0.7260 -1.5815 
Bootstrap p-value 0.9965 0.9663 0.9723 0.9956 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0040 0.0465 
 
t-alpha sort 2.5179 1.7956 1.1643 0.7188 -1.1398 -1.6404 -2.1103 -2.6126 
Bootstrap p-value 0.8872 0.5211 0.9944 0.9956 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0001 0.3974 
 
Panel B : Alpha,  3F plus TM (rm2 ) model 
 
 Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% Bottom 20% Bottom 10% Bottom 5% Bottom 1% 
Fund’s Rank 6 28 56 112 445 500 528 550 
Alpha sort (% p.m.) 1.3671 0.7568 0.5727 0.3609 -0.3247 -0.5909 -0.9328 -1.9162 
Bootstrap p-value 0.5747 0.0989 0.0007 < 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0029 0.1120 
 
t-alpha sort 3.1126 2.3586 1.7012 1.1310 -0.9424 -1.3714 -1.7245 -2.4619 
Bootstrap p-value 0.0837 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0459 0.1440 0.3782 0.6984 
 
Panel C : Total Performance,  3F plus TM (rm2 ) model 
 
 Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 20% Bottom 20% Bottom 10% Bottom 5% Bottom 1% 
Fund’s Rank  6 28 56 112 445 500 528 550 
Perf. sort (% p.m.) 0.8115 0.4592 0.3167 0.1598 -0.3237 -0.5599 -0.7377 -1.5379 
Bootstrap p-value 1.00 1.00 0.9998 0.9915 0.9915 0.9704 0.9982 0.8493 
 
t-perf. sort 2.5437 1.8393 1.1832 0.6799 -1.1564 -1.7367 -2.1355 -2.9461 
Bootstrap p-value 0.9992 0.9914 1.00 1.00 0.9470 0.9279 0.5935 0.1389 
 
